Resource Access Control with Authorization-Certificates[1]

(An Application of Public-key Infrastructure and Digitally Signed Certificates)

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Security for Widely Distributed Systems - Overall Approach

Our scientific environment:

♦ **multi-user instruments at national facilities**

♦ **widely distributed supercomputers and large-scale storage systems**

♦ **data sharing in restricted collaborations**

♦ **network-based multimedia collaboration channels**

involves facilities, collaboration, and stakeholders that are diffuse: geographically distributed and multi-organizational.

This gives rise to a requirement for distributed management of distributed access control.

Use-conditions are Imposed by Independent Stakeholders

Stakeholders provide and maintain and use-conditions

DOE-HQ

LBNL

ALS

Users have Attributes that Match the Use-conditions

Memo	
exclude "bad" countries	

Attribute certifiers trusted by the stakeholders

Memo	
include all LBNL staff and guests	

UC

Memo	
must have X-ray safety training	

ALS Medical Beamline*

Memo	
must have approved protocol	

Group PI

Memo	
must be group member	

access control gateway

STOP

access request

Passport agency → good country

LBNL Personnel Dept. → LBNL employee or guest

XYZ State University → X-ray 101

U.C. Human Use Committee → approved protocol

ALS Medical Beamline group PI → Medical R&D group

Access is Granted after Matching Use-conditions and Attributes

*hypothetical

Figure 1. Societal Access Control Model

Goals

Capabilities and tools in our computing and communications environment that reflect the societal model:

- **stakeholders independently make assertions**

- **dynamic and easily used mechanisms**

- **strong assurances**

The General Security Model for Access Control

The goal of the security model is to be able to support a variety of policy models, including flat and hierarchical authority, and decentralized and centralized management of access rights.

The security model provides for controlling access to resources via restrictions imposed by several types of use-conditions that are defined independently by multiple stakeholders:

- access groups are defined implicitly by requiring a set of attributes
- actions on resources may be further restricted by requiring additional attributes (evaluated independently of access)
- operational requirements (e.g. time-of-day) are defined and satisfied by "data fields" in attribute certificates

These use-conditions are satisfied by (certified) attributes of those entities trying to gain access to resources.

Security Model

composite
access-group

Stakeholder_1
requires Attribute_1
and Attribute_2

S_2 requires
A_3 and A_4

sets of required
attributes define
access-groups

S_3 requires
A_5 and A_6

S_4 requires
A_6 for
Action_1

separate attributes
may be required
for an action on
the resource

Access Groups are Defined by Several Required Attributes

Approach

♦ **Architecture:**

  • **data driven certificate analysis (no semantic analysis of the use-conditions)**

  • **user capability (verified, required attributes) are provided to the protected resource to enable fine-grained control**

 • **existing services provide end-to-end security**

♦ **Certificate management**

Approach

Figure 2. The Overall Architecture of the Authorization Certificate Approach

Main diagram content:

generate authoritative information

Certification Authorities (identity - e.g. X.509)

Attribute Authorities (user characteristics)

Authorization Authorities (resource owner generated use-conditions)

digitally signed documents generated by many independent principals

certificate servers
♦ identity
♦ use-conditions
♦ attributes

(trusted agents of the signing authorities)

authorize

policy engine
(acts on behalf of all stakeholders)
♦ Ensure stakeholder representation
♦ Evaluate policy and verify certificates (i.e., matches use-conditions and attributes)
♦ Issue an access capability for an entity (user)

Stakeholder identities

auth req   resp

operate

user identity

authorization request

user client application (e.g. Web browser)

access control gateway
♦ Acquire capability from policy engine
♦ Enforce "check immediate" requirements (e.g. re-authenticate user identity and/or use-condition certificates, collect payment, etc.)

security services
♦ Set up security context between user-client and resource, using, e.g. Apache/SSL or SPKM/GSS

secure platform

resource
♦ fine-grained access control: enforce profiles of permitted actions, parameter ranges, time slots, etc.
♦ content - e.g. data-objects, compute server, digital library, instruments, etc.

Policy Model

A *policy model* is built on a general security model in a way that will support the access policies needed in a particular resource domain.

The characteristics of a particular policy model - e.g. hierarchical authority with delegation - is a function of the resource / application domain.

Policy Model

LBNL Image Library — Top-level Index

Digital Library
- ♦ **owned by Webmaster**
- ♦ **resources allocated by policy**
- ♦ **designates collection owners**

Widget Project Collection
- ♦ **owned by project PI**
- ♦ **available only to project**

Lung Collaboration collection summary
- ♦ **owned by collaboration curator**
- ♦ **available to DOE Labs and collaborators**

②

Figure 5. Policy Model: Domains of Control and Access

LBNL Image Library — Collection LUNG_STRUCTURE

Group summary data
- ♦ **owned by group curators**
- ♦ **available to collaboration only**

③

Individual investigator's data
- ♦ **owned by investigator**
- ♦ **available only to investigator and co-workers**

④

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Policy Model

http://ImgLib.lbl.gov

required_attribute **"DN Mary Thompson"**
*enables (***read** *and* **write** *and* **create_col***)*
for **http://ImgLib.gov/Lung_Collab**
with scope **sub-tree**
issuer= Webmaster
①

- The <u>Webmaster delegates</u> to Mary Thompson the authority to manage the *Lung_Collab* collection.

Lung_Collab

*required_attribute (***group = "Lung_Collab Group"** *or*
O=Sandia *or* **O=LBNL** *or* **O=LLNL***)*
enables access for **http://ImgLib.lbl.gov/Lung_Collab**
with scope **sub-tree**
issuer= "Mary Thompson"
②

- Mary Thompson <u>establishes the general access group for the collection</u>. This access group may only be further restricted from this point down.
- Another certificate at this level grants *read* to this same group.

required_attribute **group=group_a_admin**
*enables (***read** *and* **write** *and* **create_col***)*
for **http://ImgLib.gov/Lung_Collab/group_a**
with scope **sub-tree**
issuer= "Mary Thompson"
③

- Mary Thompson <u>delegates management of the *group_a* collection</u> to anyone in *group_a_admin*.
- Another certificate would define the access group as *Lung_Collab* only.

group_a

(required_attribute **"CN Mary Zolar"** *enables (***read** *and*
write *and* **create_col***) and (required_attribute* **"DN John
Walker"** *enables (***read** *and* **write***)*
for **http://ImgLib.gov/Lung_Collab/group_a/data_a**
with scope **sub-tree**
issuer= "Jim Bean"
④

- Jim Bean (in *group_a_admin*) <u>delegates *data_a* collection management</u> to investigator Mary Zolar and grants John Walker (Zolar co-worker) read and write (object create) permission.

data_a   **data_b**   **data_c**

general access area for collaboration and "friends"

prototype group access area

prototype PI access area

Figure 7. Access Control Policy Model Example

Example

The following figures illustrate the flow of control and information in the Akenti access control system.

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John Walker
(Mary Zolar co-worker)
University of Montana-Missoula

Mary Thompson
(Lung collab. leader)
UW, Milwaukee

http://lung.bio.uwm.edu

request for access

http://ImgLib.lbl.gov

Digital Library

Widget Project

Lung Collaboration collection summary

Publicly available information§

Group summary data§

Individual investigator's data§

Mary Zolar
(data_a owner)
LSU

Jim Bean
(group_a lead)
U. of Alaska

http://bio-a.alaska.edu

Figure 9. Access Control - Step 1:
A request for access is made to a private data area of the digital library on ImgLib.lbl.gov

John Walker
(Mary Zolar co-worker)
University of Montana-Missoula

The use-conditions are formulated and controlled in the environment of the stakeholders.

request for access

1 **Mary Thompson**
(Lung collab. leader)
UW, Milwaukee

http://lung.bio.uwm.edu

http://ImgLib.lbl.gov

use-conditions

2

3

Mary Zolar
(data_a owner)
LSU

4

Jim Bean
(group_a lead)
U. of Alaska

http://bio-a.alaska.edu

Figure 10. Access Control - Step 2

The request for access causes the policy engine to identify the stakeholders and retrieve their use-conditions.

Identity certificates provide one set of user attributes.

X.509 Certification Authority

**John Walker
(Mary Zolar co-worker)
University of Montana-Missoula**

(1A) (2A) (4A)

(2A) (3A)

validated attributes

**collaboration identity
Certification Authority**

ldap://glow-plug.snl.gov

1 **Mary Thompson
(Lung collab. leader)
UW, Milwaukee**

http://lung.bio.uwm.edu

Use-Condition Generator

Attribute Generator

http://ImgLib.lbl.gov

Digital Library

Widget Project

Lung Collaboration collection summary

Publicly available information§

Group summary data§

Individual investigator's data§

use-conditions

(2)

(3)

Other types of attributes are defined by the stakeholders and certified by designated authorities.

request for access

**Mary Zolar
(data_a owner)
LSU**

(4)

http://bio.lsu.edu

**Jim Bean
(group_a lead)
U. of Alaska**

Use-Condition Generator

http://bio-a.alaska.edu

Figure 11. Access Control - Step 3

The use-conditions require the user to possess a set of attributes. These attributes are collected and checked. (Some of the attributes come from the user's identity certificate.)

X.509 Certification Authority

**John Walker
(Mary Zolar co-worker)
University of Montana-Missoula**

2A

1A

2A

3A

4A

**collaboration identity
Certification Authority**

ldap://glow-plug.snl.gov

**validated
attributes**

**secure
channel**

Use-Condition Generator

Attribute Generator

1 **Mary Thompson
(Lung collab. leader)
UW, Milwaukee**

http://lung.bio.uwm.edu

http://ImgLib.lbl.gov

Digital Library

Widget Project

Lung Collaboration collection summary

Publicly available information§

Group summary data§

Individual investigator's data§

use-conditions

2

3

**request
for access**

**Mary Zolar
(data_a owner)
LSU**

4 **http://bio.lsu.edu**

**Jim Bean
(group_a lead)
U. of Alaska**

Use-Condition Generator

Figure 12. Access Control - Step 4

**The access control decision (affirmative) is passed to the
Web server that then establishes a secure communication
channel to the requester.**

http://bio-a.alaska.edu

Certificate Infrastructure

How are certificates generated and managed is a key factor for the usability of the access control system.

♦ **Must be very simple for the user**

♦ **Must be relatively simple for stakeholders**

♦ **Must not be an administrative burden**

Netscape has built a nice collection of certificate management tools and user interfaces, and our implementation uses these facilities.

Certificate Infrastructure

The Netscape 4 / Communicator security interface - after an identity certificate has been installed.

In general, users will probably have several identities.

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Certificate Infrastructure

Establish user identity: the request to the certification authority.

Certificate Infrastructure

Certificate Infrastructure

♦ **Stakeholder interaction**

Use-condition certificates specify a set of attributes that must be presented in order to allow access to, and actions on a resource.

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Certificate Infrastructure

♦ **By naming the resource, the use-condition issuers (stakeholders) are identified (the *.htauthority* file for the resource is retrieved)**

♦ **Authority scoping is dependent on the nature of the resource policy model. For Web servers scoping is established by the location of the stakeholder in the directory hierarchy.**

Certificate Infrastructure

♦ **Pick the stakeholder persona that will issue this use condition and unlock the signing key**

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Certificate Infrastructure

- **The use-condition certificate specifies required attributes and values, together with who is trusted to attest to those attributes.**

- **Attributes may be arbitrary name-value pairs, or a component of an X.509 distinguished name.**

Certificate Infrastructure

♦ **If the required attribute is from an X.509 certificate, then the CA of the user is that which issued the identity certificate**

♦ **If the required attribute is defined by the stakeholder, then the identity verifier of the user must be separately specified.**

Certificate Infrastructure

♦ **In addition to undifferentiated access rights, the use-condition certificate can encode qualifications on actions. The policy engine extracts the permitted "actions" as uninterpreted keywords and passes them to the resource server where the action keywords are associated with methods that act on the resource.**

Certificate Infrastructure

♦ **For resources with a hierarchical policy model, the scope of the use-condition certificate must be specified.**

Certificate Infrastructure

Review Use Conditions Set

IF <expression> THEN <action(s)> WITH <scope>

IF cn = William E. Johnston u1 and cn = Srilekha S. Mudumbai - sandy1@lbl.g

Attributes, Attribute Certificate Issuers and their CAs

Subject CA — Laboratory/OU=ICSD/CN=IDCG-CA

Use Condition Issuer — =ICSD/CN=William E. Johnston sg1

Use Condition Issuer's CA — Laboratory/OU=ICSD/CN=IDCG-CA

Add more Conditions   **Cancel**   **< Back**   **SIGN**

Directory Service : Save Certificate

Enter path or folder name:

/home/itgsrc/security/src/security/lib/Java/

Filter
[^.]*

Folders
..
Certs
CVS
Database
java

Files
Action.sh
ActionCertificate.java
AddDelListDialog.java
Attribute.sh
Attribute.sh.old
AttributeCertificate.gui
AttributeCertificate.java
AttributeCertificate.map

Enter file name:

OK   Update   Cancel

=IDCG-CA" "/C=US/O=Lawrence Berkeley Nati

iases Preferences Quit
rid.Chapter sysadm
mmit Search... More...

ilable in
Internet S
s Day but
*****SUNSO
yet recei
signed it
x version

ssion 3DES 9,41 12
mpression 3DES 14,31

Certificate Infrastructure

GENERATE KEY AND REQUEST FOR SERVER (

Certificate Issuer DN	boratory/OU=ICSD/CN=William E. Johnston sg1
Password	*****************
Generate key and certificate	Quit Application

- ◆ **Signing key and certificate requests are generated by a program run in the issuer's local environment**

- ◆ **The encrypted private key and the certificate request are kept in ~issuer/.Akenti**

- ◆ **Once the certificate for the signing identity is issued, the "identity" is portable - like Netscape v.4 private keys, it may be moved from system to system.**

Certificate Infrastructure

♦ **Any "externally" generated certificate request looks like a "server" request to the Netscape CA interface - this, however, is a signing key request.**

Certificate Infrastructure

♦ **Once the signing certificate is issued and stored in the LDAP database, it is available for validating use-condition certificates**

CDS: A Simple Akenti Application

♦ **Access *Controlled Data Sharing***

CDS provides for uploading and downloading files to and from an area of a server that is access controlled by use-condition certificates.

The file may be described by a simple annotation.

**The goal is a secure and easily used, group-oriented, data sharing facility.**

Application

User view of CDS annotated file directory.

Application

Netscape: setup shared files

File   Edit   View   Go   Communicator   Help

Bookmarks   Location: https://rocky/shared/setup.cgi

Debugging output for shared–setup /C=US/O=Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory/OU=ICSD/UID=mrt/CN=Mary R. Thompson/Email=mrthompson@lbl.gov
has rights: read,write

Akenti access check for /shared

The identity

C=US
O=Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
OU=ICSD
UID=mrt
CN=Mary R. Thompson
Email=mrthompson@lbl.gov

has rights: **read,write**
In directory **/shared**

The user can query the current access rights.

Application

Debugging output for shared–setup /C=US/O=Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory/OU=ICSD/UID=mrt/CN=Mary R. Thompson/Email=mrthompson@lbl.gov has rights: read,write

LBNL Image Library –– Delete a file

Do you really want to delete the following file(s) from shared

uname

anewfile

[DELETE]

Go Back

Delete capability is granted separately from access.

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Application

Upload is intended to be simple, and provides for free-form user description of the file.

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**Information and Computing Sciences Division**

Application

Debugging output for storefile
/C=US/O=Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory/OU=ICSD/UID=mrt/CN=Mary R.
Thompson/Email=mrthompson@lbl.gov has rights: read,write
Content_length is 8385
8290: Content−Disposition: form−data; name="dir_name"
8288:
8280: shared
8234: −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−318761657324724
next block is:
Content−Disposition: form−data; name="dir_name"
shared
8184: Content−Disposition: form−data; name="file_name"
8182:
8170: testbinary
8124: −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−318761657324724
next block is:
Content−Disposition: form−data; name="file_name"
testbinary
8075: Content−Disposition: form−data; name="comments"
8073:
8049: This is a binary file
8003: −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−318761657324724
next block is:
Content−Disposition: form−data; name="comments"
This is a binary file
7932: Content−Disposition: form−data; name="userfile"; filename="mbone_vcr"
7930:
next block is:
Content−Disposition: form−data; name="userfile"; filename="mbone_vcr"

dir_name is shared
file name is testbinary
comments are This is a binary file
File length is 7930 keylength is 46 fullname is
/home/imglib3/http.rocky/htdocs/shared/testbinary

Message from script create_tags:
Successfully created file /home/imglib3/http.rocky/htdocs/shared/testbinary
**homepage for shared**

Filtering the audit log will provide user feedback.

Application

A new shared file has been created.

Application

```
Netscape:                                                                    ◢◨◧◨◨◨
File  Edit  View  Go  Communicator                                              Help
   Bookmarks   Location: https://131.243.2.48/shared/.htauthority          ▽  LBNL

CertificateDirectory public web george
CertificateDirectory public ldap idcg-ds.lbl.gov
CertificateDirectory trusted file /home/u2/users/mudumbai/Newce
UseConditionCAandIssuer "/C=US/O=Lawrence Berkeley National Lab
UseConditionCAandIssuer "/C=US/O=Lawrence Berkeley National Lab
UseCondRequired http://www-itg.lbl.gov/~mudumbai/Certificates/r
```

Users will be able to query who defines use-conditions, but not the specific use-condition.

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